Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1963

Joseph Pintar v. The Industrial Commission of Utah
et al : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Pintar v. Industrial Comm. Of Utah, No. 9864 (Utah Supreme Court, 1963).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4207

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

.IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH PINTAR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMIS- Case No.
....9468
SION OF UTAH AND COLUMBIA GENEVA STEEL DIVI~~~-¥S I 0 N, U N I T E D STATES
STEEL CORPORATION,
Defendants-Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the Judgment of the Industrial Commission

Joseph C. Fratto and
Cleon B. Feight
305 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorpeys for Appellant

Pratt A. Kesler
Attorney General for the State of Utah
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defendant-Despondent,
Industrial Commission
Parsons, Ellis, Behley & Evans
Attorners for Defendant-Respondent
Columbia Geneva Steel Division
United States Steel Corporation

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE .... I
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ············.-~·····
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ....................

2

STATEJ.\IENT OF FACTS..................................

2

ARGUMENT ............................................................

5

POINT I
That the conclusion of the Industrial Commission
that there was no causal connection between the injuries of March 29 and July 25, 1961, and any disability now existing is directly contrary to the evidence and erroneous as a rna tter of law.....................

5

POINT 2.
That the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in rejecting the conclusions of Dr. Burk M.
Snow. ............................................................................

6

POINT 3.
That the order of the Industrial Commission not
requiring defendants to pay all medical expenses is
contrary to the law and the facts of the case...............

7

POINT 4.
That the report of Dr. Burk M. Snow is competent and admissible evidence. ....................................

8

2

1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
POINT 5.
That the Industrial Commission was not bound
by the findings of the medical panel. .... .................... 9
CONCLUSION ........................................................

9

CASES CITED
Utah.. Idaho Cent. R. v. Industrial Commission,
71 Utah 490, 267 P 785 .................................... 6
Gunnison Sugar Co. v. Industrial Commission,
73 Utah 535, 275 P. 777 .................................... 7
Marker v. Industrial Commission, 84 Utah 587,
37 P2d 785 ·--~·-······················································ 8
Hackford v. Industrial Commission (Utah) ,
358 P2d 899 .......................................................... 8

STATUTES CITED
Section 35-1-77 U.C.A., 1953 ................. ~.................. 9

11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH PINTAR,
Plaintiff-.A. ppellant~
vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH AND COLUMBIA GENEVA STEEL DIVIS I 0 N, UN I T E D STATES
STEEL CORPORATION,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
9468

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OJ:i-, THE KIND OF CASE
This case involves a claim under the Workmen's
Compensation Act by Joseph Pintar for medical expenses and temporary disability compensation resulting
from a back injury suffered by Pintar on or about
March 29, 1961, and again on or about July 25, 1961,
while working for Columbia Geneva Steel Division,
United States Steel.
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DISPOSITION BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION
The case was heard by a Referee and rulings of the
Referee were affirmed by the Industrial Commission.
From a verdict and judgment for the defendant, plaintiff appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and judgment in his favor as a matter of law, or that failing, a
new hearing.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 29, 1961, while working at the Columbia
Coal Mine Diviison of Geneva Steel, claimant, Joseph
Pintar, suffered the first of two injuries involving his
lumbar (back) spine. Pintar was helping two other
men do some timbering. At the time of his injury he
was on a platform in the process of lifting a heavy
timber into place-"into the shuttle buggy." As he
was lifting this timber he felt a sharp pain go down his
·back, especially in the lower portion of his back. He was
swung around and was bent over by the pain. He was
eventually able to straighten up by hanging with his
hands onto the side of the buggy and dropping himself. He was then taken out of the mine to the hospital.
After 4 days in the hospital, where he was kept flat on
his back in bed, Pintar was returned to work. IIe was
2
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able to do only light work, however, as he had considerable pain and distress in his back. (R. 1, 2, 8, 11, 16,
24).

On July 25, 1961, while working at the Columbia
Coal Mine Division of Geneva Steel, Pintar had another
accident. At the time of this accident he was standing
near a drilling machine, which stands on a hydraulic
jack. The jack broke and moved the machine back
against him, pinning him between the machine and the
wall of the coal mine. In this accident he hurt his ribs,
neck, back and shoulder. He was taken out of the mine
and given only two physical therapy treatments. Xrays were taken which indicated that there was nothing
broken. The next day Pintar returned to light work
and managed to get along, having considerable pain
and distress until October 2, 1961, at which time he was
placed on a roof driver. This caused considerable pain
and distress and re-aggravated his chest and shoulder
complaint, incapacitating him to the extent that he was
no longer able to work. (R. 2, 14, 16, 24).
On August 28, 1961, at the request of Columbia
Geneva Steel, United States Steel Corporation, Pintar
was examined by Dr. B .•T. Larsen, their Medical Director for Utah Operations, with respect to the back
injury suffered by him on March 29, 1961. It was the
opinon of Dr. B. J. Larsen that Pintar's back complaint was the result of an arthritic condition, which
had no connection with the March 29 injury. (R. 8).
On October 17, 1961, Pintar, without permission
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from the defendants, consulted Dr. Burk M. Snow, an
orthopedic surgeon in Salt Lake City, who diagnosed
his complaint as a typical degenerative arthritic lumbar
spine seen in coal miners and other people dqipg heavy
work, aggravated by the injuries of March 29 and July
25, 1961. X-rays were taken which showed a rib fracture
on the left. Dr. Snow advised Pintar not to do any
heavy lifting and to wear a chair-type lumbosacral brace
and rib belt. (R. 4) .
On December 26, 1961, as the result of an "Application to Settle Industrial Accident Claim" filed by
Pintar, the Industrial Commission appointed a medical
panel to investigate the medical aspects of said claim
and report its findings of fact and conclusions to the
Commission. (R. 18).
On February 16, 1962, said medical panel found
and concluded that there was no connection between the
injuries of March 29 and July 25, 1961, and any permanent disability now existing with Pintar. (R. 24).
As the result of an "Application for Adjustment
of Claim" filed by Pintar, a hearing was held before a
referee of ~the Industrial Commission on September 4,
1962. The referee recommended that the report of the
medical panel be adopted and that Pintar's claim be
denied, except that Columbia Geneva Steel, United
States Steel Corporation, should be ordered to pay for
brace purchased for_ Pintar's back. (R. 46).
On December 12, 1962, the Industrial Commission
adopted the recommended findings of fact and conclu-
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sons of law of the referee and entered its order accordingly. (R. 45).
Within thirty days thereafter Pintar filed an application for rehearing, which was denied by the Industrial
Commission on February 6, 1962. Pintar then filed a
petition for a 'Vrit of Certiorari on JVIarch 5, 1962.
(R. 51).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THAT THE CONCLUSION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION THAT THERE
WAS NO CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN
THE INJURIES OF MARCH 29 AND JULY
25, 1961, AND ANY DISABILITY NOW EXISTING IS DIRECTLY CONTRARY TO THE
EVIDENCE AND ERRONEOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW.
It is an undisputed fact that Pintar was involved
in two accidents while employed by the defendant, Columbia Geneva Steel Division, United States Steel
Corporation.· (R. I, 2, 8, 9, 12, 14). There is substantial evidence that prior to these accidents Pindar worked
for the defendant steel corporation for eleven years
without any lost time accidents and without being ·off
work due to his arthritic condition. (R. 2, 5). Also,
there is substantial evidence that Pintar was capable
of doing heavy work and was employed to do such work
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until the time of the first accident. (R. 2, 8, 9}. There
is little doubt that either of these accidents could have
and did light up or aggravate Pintar's arthritic condition for which defendant steel corporation would
have been and is liable. (R. 4, 32, 33, 39).
The Commission in its conclusions chose to ignore
the well-established rule of law that aggravation of a
pre-:-existing condition by an industrial accident is compensable under the act .. This rule is stated in Utah-Idaho
Cent. R. v. Industrial Commission., 71 Utah 490, 267
P 785, where the court said:
"It is no longer an open question in this state
that, other necessary conditions being present,
a pre-existing disease or other disturbed condition of the physical structure of the body, when
aggravated or lighted up by an accident is compensable under the act."

POINT 2.
THAT THE COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY IN REJECTING THE CONCLUSIONS OF' DR.
BURK M. SNOW.
The Cormriission ignored the conclusions of Dr.
Burk M. Snow, Orthopedic Surgeon, as stated in his
letter of October 17, 1961.
''CONCLUSIONS: From the available history given by the patient it seems that the only
conclusion one can come to is that this patient
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received an aggravation of a previously existing
degenerative process in the lumbar spine. The
conditions were present and he had been daily
on a regular basis with no back complaints prior
to his injury. The rib complaints certainly are
industrial." (R. 4).
These conclusions were ignored for no other reason, it
would appear, than the misconception that an employee
does not have the legal right to consult a physician on
his own without permission of his employer or the Industrial Commission, in Gunnison Sugar Co. v. Industrial Commission~ 73 Utah 535, 275 P. 777, the court
said:
"If injured employee himself employs a physician to attend him, and he is not negligent in
seeking or employing such physical, but due
to erroneous diaj.n.os iSj employee has all of his
teeth unnecessarily extracted, he may recover
therefor as being attributable to the accident or
injury, and not due to an independent and intervening cause."
POINT 3.
THAT THE ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION NOT REQUIRING DEl?ENDANTS TO PAY ALL .MEDICAL EXPENSES IS CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND
TO 'rHE FACTS OF TI-lE CASE.
In the absence of an Apportionment Statute, which
Utah does not have, the general rule is that the employer becomes liable for the entire disability resulting
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from a compensable accident. Therefore, if an enlployee already had only one eye or leg or hand, the
employer becomes liable for total disability upon the
loss of the remaining eye, or leg or hand. See Marker
v. Industrial Commission~ 84 Utah 587, 37 P.2nd 785,
where the court said:
"The principle is not limited to cumulation
resulting ina total disability but may apply to
a permanent partial award made up in part of
a pre-existing disability."
There is no question that each of these accidents was
compensable. This fact was conclusively established by
the Commission itself. In its order, the Industrial Commission required the defendant steel company to pay
for the brace purchased by Pintar for his back upon
recommendation of Dr. Snow. (R. 45}.
POINT 4.
THE REPORT OF DR. BURK M. SNOW
IS COMPETENT AND ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE.
It is respectfully submitted that there is nothing
in the record which intrinsically discredits the evidence
provided by Dr. -Snow, which evidence is competent
and admissible. See H ackford v. Industrial CommissionJ (Utah) 358 P.2d 899, where the court said:
"In a proceeding to determine disability, the
Commission properly received into evidence the
reports of a physician even though they were
hearsay.''
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POINT 5.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS
NOT BOUND BY THE FINDINGS OF THE
MEDICAL PANEL.
Section 35-1-7 U.C.A., 1953, states the Commission
is not bound by the findings of the medical panel if there
is other substantial conflicting evidence which supports
a contrary finding by the Commission. Such evidence
is available in this case. (R. 4, 32, 33, 39).
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the decision of the Industrial
Commission is clearly arbitrary and capricious, not supported by the facts and contrary to law and should be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
JOSEPH C. FRATTO and
CLEON B. FEIGHT
305 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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